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When they interact in everyday situations, people constantly create new fragments of social reality: they do so 
when they make promises or agreements, but also when they submit requests or answer questions, when they 
greet each other or express gratitude. This type of social reality ‘in the small,’ that we call interpersonal reality, 
is normative in nature as all other kinds of social reality; what makes it somewhat special is that its 
normativity applies to the very same persons who create it in their interactions. We first show that 
interpersonal reality can be accounted for in terms of a suitable concept of interpersonal responsibility, which 
in turn can be understood as a form of second-personal responsibility (in Darwall’s sense), intentionally co-
constructed by two or more agents for themselves. Then we introduce certain significant subspecies of 
interpersonal responsibility, namely mutual and joint responsibility, and compare them with Gilbert’s notion 
of joint commitment. Finally we discuss how relationships of interpersonal responsibility can be brought 
about through communicative acts, understood as actions performed with underlying communicative 
intentions. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
When they interact in everyday situations, people constantly create new fragments of social 
reality. They do so when they make promises or agreements, but also when they submit requests 
or answer questions, when they greet each other or express gratitude. Sometimes pieces of social 
reality are produced without uttering a word, like for example when one keeps a door open for 
somebody while smiling to mean “After you, please.” As we have argued elsewhere (Carassa & 
Colombetti 2013), this type of social reality ‘in the small,’ which we call interpersonal reality, is 
normative in nature and thus, in this respect, does not differ from other kinds of social reality. 
What makes interpersonal reality somewhat special is that its normativity is, so to speak, 
contractual, in that it applies to the very same persons who create it in their interactions. This is 
not the case with other types of social reality, like for example the world of etiquette, whose 
norms are understood, by those who endorse them, as being binding also for those who do not 
actively participate in its creation. 
Interpersonal reality is so pervasive in our everyday lives that understanding how people actually 
create and modify it is an important matter. Two main issues concerning interpersonal reality 
deserve clarification. First, what is the nature of its normativity? And second, how is such 
normativity actually created in everyday interactions? In our past work (Carassa & Colombetti 
2009a, 2009b, 2011, 2013) we proposed to understand interpersonal reality in terms of Margaret 
Gilbert’s concept of a joint commitment to do something as a body (Gilbert 1989, 1996, 2000, 2006), 
which appeared to fit our goals for two main reasons: first, because joint commitments entail the 
kind of normative relationships (like bipolar obligations and rights) that we take to be typical of 
interpersonal reality; and second, because Gilbert’s conditions for the creation of joint 
commitments (i.e., that the relevant parties mutually express their readiness to be jointly 
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committed, in conditions of common knowledge) lie in the range of what people engaged in 
ordinary communicative interactions can do. 
In furthering our analysis we partially departed from Gilbert’s approach for a number of reasons 
that we shall clarify later on. To capture the collective normativity of interpersonal reality we have 
introduced a new concept, to wit, interpersonal responsibility, which we understand as a species of 
Darwall’s concept of second-personal responsibility (Darwall 2006). More precisely, we shall 
argue that interpersonal reality is constituted by relationships of interpersonal responsibility, 
which in turn can be understood as those relationships of second-personal responsibility that are 
intentionally co-constructed by two or more agents for themselves. 
If interpersonal reality is analysed in terms of relationships of interpersonal responsibility, the 
second issue we mentioned before now becomes, how do agents concretely create such 
relationships in their everyday interactions? The answer we shall submit is that agents bring about 
interpersonal responsibilities through communicative interactions, thanks to the particular 
intentional structure that is distinctive of communicative acts. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we define interpersonal reality in terms of 
relationships of interpersonal responsibility. In Section 3 we analyse certain special configurations 
of interpersonal responsibility, which we call mutual and joint responsibility. In Section 4 we 
compare these concepts with Gilbert’s notion of joint commitment. In Section 5 we discuss how 
relationships of interpersonal responsibility can be actually brought about by communicative acts, 
understood as actions performed with underlying communicative intentions. Finally, in Section 6 
we draw some conclusions and delineate directions for future work. 
2. Interpersonal reality 
By definition, we consider interpersonal reality as the fragment of social reality that two or more 
agents co-construct for themselves. We follow John Searle (1995, 2010) in understanding social 
reality, in general, as a matter of collectively accepting or recognising positive and negative 
“deontic powers,” that is, normative relationships of bipolar obligation, right, entitlement, and 
the like. Searle suggests that the type of acceptance required for the construction of the social 
world is a form of collective intentionality, which is not reducible to personal intentionality even 
in conditions of common belief. He has defended this position in many writings, at least since his 
paper on collective intentions and actions (Searle 1990); in Making the Social World, however, he 
clearly distinguishes between a stronger form of collective intentionality, that he calls cooperation, 
and a weaker form, that he calls collective recognition (Searle 2010: 56–57): 
«For example, in an actual transaction when I buy something from somebody and put 
money in their hands, which they accept, we have full-blown cooperation. But in addition 
to this intentionality, we have prior to the transaction and continuing after the transaction 
an attitude toward the pieces of paper of the type that I am placing in the hands of the 
seller, that we both recognize or accept the pieces of paper as money, and indeed, we 
accept the general institution of money as well as the institution of commerce. As a general 
point, institutional structures require collective recognition by the participants in the institution 
in order to function, but particular transactions within the institution require cooperation of 
the sort that I have been describing.»  
The point that Searle is making here is that creating a new piece of social reality involves more 
than what is required to recognise social reality which has been created elsewhere. It is the former 
type of social reality, which is cooperatively co-constructed by two or more agents, that we call 
“interpersonal reality.” In other words, interpersonal reality is constituted by those normative 
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relationships that are created by the very same agents who are bound by them; typical examples 
are the normative relationships resulting from promises, agreements, and the like. 
Normative relationships may take different forms, which can be analysed drawing inspiration 
from Hohfeld’s treatment of legal relationships (Hohfeld 1923). In particular we find it useful to 
distinguish between two levels of normativity. The first level, that we call deontic (from the Greek 
déon, duty), concerns what is obligatory, permissible, impermissible, etc., for an agent to do, in 
view of the normative relationships that currently bind him or her to another agent.1 The second 
level, that we call kratic (from the Greek krátos, power), concerns an agent’s capacity to create 
new normative relationships, which in turn may pertain to the deontic or to the kratic level. 
Both deontic and kratic relationships are bipolar or directed,2 in the sense that they relate two agents 
holding complementary positions, which we respectively call the debtor and the creditor of the 
relationship. An obligation, for example, is a deontic relationship of some agent A (the debtor of 
the obligation) to another agent B (the creditor of the obligation), which is satisfied if, and only if, 
A performs an action of a given type. The same deontic relationship, viewed from the creditor’s 
position, can be described as B’s right against A, that A performs the action. In Hohfeld’s terms, 
A’s obligation and B’s right are correlative: as such they should not be regarded as two different 
normative relationships, but rather as the descriptions of the same relationship from two 
different viewpoints (the debtor’s and the creditor’s, respectively).3 Kratic relationship have an 
analogous structure. For example, A may have the stand to order B to do X, thus creating an 
obligation of B to A to do X; in such a case we say that A has the power over B to order that B 
does X, or that B is liable to A concerning orders to do X. Again, the two descriptions are 
correlative, in the sense that they describe the same relationship from the debtor’s and the 
creditor’s point of view. 
Human beings can be bound by different types of normative relationships (moral, social, legal, 
political, and so on), which differ in many respects and in particular in the processes through 
which they are brought about. By definition, interpersonal normative relationships (like the 
obligations arising from promises and agreements) are created by the same agents that are bound 
by them. For example, if Ann and Bob agree to go dancing together next Saturday night, the two 
of them are both the agents who intentionally create the agreement, and those who are bound by 
it. On the contrary, normative relationships that are not interpersonal are usually purported, by 
those who collectively create them, to bind a wider set of agents, whether or not these intend to 
                                                 
1  For simplicity’s sake we limit our treatment to situations involving two agents, but nothing seems to 
prevent a generalisation to larger groups. 
2  We do not deny that it may make sense to deal with ‘unipolar’ or ‘undirected’ obligations, etc. If at all 
possible, however, these would not count as normative relationships. 
3  It is important not to confuse the creditor of an obligation with a possible beneficiary of the action that is 
owed by the debtor to the creditor. For example, if Ann promises to Bob to bring him a bottle of ice 
wine from Canada, and her promise is accepted, then an obligation is created, with Ann as the debtor 
and Bob as the creditor, to the effect that Ann will bring to Bob a bottle of ice wine from Canada. In a 
slightly different example, Ann may promise to Bob to bring a bottle of ice wine to his sister Claire, 
whom they both know to be fond of sweet wines. In this case Ann will be obligated to Bob to the effect 
that she brings a bottle of ice wine to Claire: in other words, Ann is the debtor and Bob is the creditor of 
an obligation to perform an action that will mainly benefit a third subject, Claire. Being a beneficiary of 
an action is different from being the creditor of an obligation to perform the action: even if the person 
who will mainly benefit from Ann’s action is Claire, Ann’s promise is a promise to Bob, not to Claire; 
therefore, if Ann fails to keep her promise, then she violates a deontic relationship that binds her to 
Bob, not to Claire. This distinction can easily be overlooked because it often happens that the creditor 
of an obligation is also a beneficiary of the action (although not necessarily the only one): this is 
constitutive, for example, of promissory obligations. 
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be so bound; this appears to be typical of social, legal, and moral norms,4 to which people are 
considered to be liable even if they do not participate in making them. 
All normative relationships, whether deontic or kratic, concern the fact that the debtor is 
accountable or responsible to the creditor in a way or another. For example, saying that A is obligated 
to B to do X is equivalent to saying that A is responsible to B for doing X; and saying that A has 
the power to order to B to do X is equivalent to saying that B will be responsible to A for doing 
X if A so orders. This suggests that we can take a suitable concept of being responsible to as a 
primitive, in terms of which all normative concepts can be defined. 
The concept of responsibility has been extensively analysed in the literature (see for example 
Fischer 1986; Scanlon 1998, Ch. 6; Franken Paul et al. 1999; Cane 2002). A crucial distinction is 
between historic (or backward-looking) and prospective (or forward-looking) responsibility. Historic 
responsibility concerns something that happened in the past; for example, if one says that parents 
are responsible for the misconduct of their children, what is at stake is historic responsibility. On 
the contrary, prospective responsibility has to do with future courses of events; for example, 
saying that parents are responsible for the safeness of their children concerns prospective 
responsibility. In this paper we are only concerned with prospective responsibility (which, for the 
sake of brevity, we shall simply call “responsibility”). 
In our view the concept of responsibility that can best serve as the starting point for the analysis 
of interpersonal reality is Stephen Darwall’s notion of responsibility as a second-personal concept 
(Darwall 2006). According to Darwall, responsibility to (i.e., the relationship between an agent and 
another agent, to whom the former is answerable for something) is one of four irreducible, 
logically related concepts which, besides responsibility, include practical authority, valid claim or 
demand, and second-personal reason for acting. In short, the logical connections between the four 
concepts can be summarised as follows: an agent, A, is responsible to another agent, B, for doing 
X, if and only if B has the practical authority to address to A a valid claim or demand that A does 
X; in turn, B’s valid claim or demand constitutes a second-personal reason for A to do X (see for 
example Darwall 2009: 142-143). In particular, practical authority can be regarded as the 
correlative of responsibility (Darwall 2009: 141): 
“If one person has practical authority with respect to another, then this would seem to 
mean, not just that the latter has a reason ... for acting as the former directs, but also that 
the latter has some responsibility to the former for doing so, that the latter is, in some way 
or other, answerable to the former.” 
Darwall’s concept of practical authority concerns both the deontic and the kratic level. One of 
Darwall’s favourite examples, namely, the practical authority we all have to demand of anybody 
that they remove their foot from on top of ours (Darwall 2006: 5ff.) is an instance of a second-
personal right concerning the integrity of our body, and therefore pertains to the deontic level. 
On the contrary our practical authority to partake in transactions like promises of agreements 
(Darwall 2011) is an instance of second-personal power (i.e., the capacity to create new second-
personal relationships) and thus pertains to the kratic level. 
Beyond the distinction between the deontic and the kratic level, another important difference can 
be introduced by borrowing two terms from the legal tradition.5 Both the rights concerning body 
                                                 
4  We understand that the extent to which a certain type of normative relationship can be qualified as 
“moral” or “non-moral” may be controversial. Our use of the term is coherent with Strawson’s remark 
that qualifying something as “moral” typically involves an impersonal point of view: «What we have 
here is, as it were, resentment on behalf of another, where one’s own interest and dignity are not 
involved; and it is this impersonal or vicarious character of the attitude, added to its others, which 
entitle it to the qualification ‘moral’.» (Strawson 1962/1993: 84).  
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integrity and the powers to participate in transactions are erga omnes, in the sense that they are 
rights against and powers over everybody. On the contrary, the normative relationships brought 
about by a successful transaction are inter partes, in the sense that they bind only those agents 
involved in the transaction.6  
It follows from what we have said so far that we regard interpersonal reality as constituted by 
relationships of responsibility, and in particular by those relationships of responsibility that are 
inter partes as clarified above. A normative relationship of this kind we call an interpersonal 
responsibility; in other words, an interpersonal responsibility is a relationship of responsibility that 
is collectively constructed by those agents who are bound by it. Moreover, by the term 
interpersonal authority we denote the correlative of interpersonal responsibility. 
The fact that interpersonal responsibility is a collective construction of its parties has at least two 
important consequences. The first is that an agent can incur an interpersonal responsibility only 
intentionally; more precisely, the creation of an interpersonal responsibility (and of its correlative 
interpersonal authority) requires the intentional contributions of both parties7. The second 
consequence is that a relationship of interpersonal responsibility can be successfully created only 
if this is common knowledge of its parties. Indeed, A can properly regard themself as the debtor 
of a relationship of interpersonal responsibility to B if, and only if, B regards themself as the 
creditor of the same relationship. This is not the case with all types of responsibility: for example, 
Bob may consider himself as responsible of the well-being of his old father irrespective of the 
fact that the latter does or does not hold Bob to be so responsible; but responsibilities of this 
type do not involve a ‘contractual’ or ‘transactional’ relationship between a debtor and a 
creditor—in a word, they are not instances of interpersonal responsibility.  
3. Interpersonal, mutual, and joint responsibility  
In the previous section we have seen that relationships of interpersonal responsibility are 
intrinsically collective, in the sense that an agent can regard herself as the debtor of an 
interpersonal responsibility to another agent if, and only if, the latter regards himself as the 
creditor of the same relationship. There is a further sense in which interpersonal responsibilities 
are collective, namely, that creating them requires that the parties carry out a suitable collective 
activity which, as we shall argue in Section 5, basically consists in performing communicative acts. 
From this, however, one should not conclude that the content of an interpersonal responsibility 
(i.e., the activity or state of affairs for which the debtor is accountable to the creditor) is itself 
collective; in fact, this may or may not be the case, depending on the situation. In this section we 
turn to this issue; in particular we shall analyse certain significant configurations of interpersonal 
responsibilities, that we call mutual and joint responsibilities, which differ from the point of view 
of the ‘allocation of agency’ to the parties. 
Let us consider three different examples to be used as paradigmatic scenarios in the following 
discussion: 
                                                                                                                                                        
5  We do not claim that our use of the two terms closely corresponds to current legal practice. It seems to 
us, however, that we are faithful to their literal meaning. 
6  By this we do not intend to deny that every member of the ‘moral community’ has the ‘representative 
authority’ to recognise the normative relationships brought about by the transaction (see Darwall 2012). 
7  Clearly an agent may accrue a responsibility unintentionally: for example, accidentally causing a damage 
makes one responsible for compensation; but this would not be a case of interpersonal responsibility as 
we have defined it. 
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1. After dinner, Bob has the habit of smoking a Cuban cigar sitting on the sofa. One day, 
while he is puffing a gigantic maduro, he says to Ann, “I promise that starting tomorrow 
I’ll go smoking in the garden.” To which Ann answers, “Very good idea, Bob!” 
2. Ann says to Bob, “If you do the laundry, I’ll make dinner,” and Bob accepts (see Gilbert 
2000: 50). 
3. Ann and Bob are spending a few days in Buenos Aires. They enter a dancing hall: “Shall 
we tango?” asks Bob; “Oh, I’d love to,” answers Ann. 
These examples have something in common: in all cases Ann and Bob agree on a course of 
action (at least in some sense of “agreeing”). But there are also differences: in case 1, there is 
nothing that Ann is required to do or to refrain from doing; in case 2, Ann and Bob are required 
to carry out two independent courses of action in parallel; and in case 3, there is one collective 
activity for Ann and Bob to perform, each of them doing their own part. How are we going to 
make sense of these differences?  
In case 1, Bob promises to Ann that from the following day he will go in the garden to smoke his 
after-dinner cigar, and Ann accepts the promise. We regard an act of promising to do X as an 
offer, made by the promisor to the promisee, to the effect that the promisor takes responsibility 
to do X, on condition that the promisee accepts the correlative authority (i.e., the role of the 
creditor of the responsibility).8 In case 1 a relationship of interpersonal responsibility of Bob to 
Ann is successfully created; while this responsibility is irreducibly collective (as we have argued in 
Section 2), its content involves no collective activity. It is often remarked that even with unilateral 
promises, like the one of our example, the promisee is not completely ‘passive,’ but is required to 
do certain things, or at least to abstain from doing certain things; for example, the promisee is 
supposed not to sabotage the promisor’s attempts to fulfil his promise. But while this is arguably 
true, it is not sufficient to turn the promisor’s unilateral action into an instance of doing 
something together with the promisee. 
Example 2 can be analysed in similar terms. In this case, however, the interaction between Ann 
and Bob creates two relationships of interpersonal responsibility that are in a sense ‘interlocked’: 
 (i) the responsibility of Ann to Bob, to the effect that Ann will make dinner, on condition that 
Bob lives up to (ii); and 
 (ii) the responsibility of Bob to Ann, to the effect that Bob will do the laundry, on condition 
that Ann lives up to (i). 
We call mutual responsibilities two relationships of interpersonal responsibility which are interlocked 
by conditions of the form (i) and (ii) above. As the example shows, there can be a situation of 
mutual responsibility even when there is no collective activity that Ann and Bob are required to 
do together; in other words there may be no activity X such that Ann and Bob could reasonably 
describe what they are doing by saying, “We are doing X.” 
Finally, concerning example 3 we say that Ann and Bob are jointly responsible for doing something. 
More precisely,  
 (i) Ann is responsible to Bob, to the effect that Ann and Bob dance tango together, with Ann 
giving an appropriate contribution, on condition that Bob lives up to (ii); and 
 (ii) Bob is responsible to Ann, to the effect that Ann and Bob dance tango together, with Ann 
giving an appropriate contribution, on condition that Ann lives up to (i). 
It should be noted that there is a substantial difference between joint responsibilities and non-
joint mutual responsibilities, which wholly resides in the structure of their contents (i.e., in the 
                                                 
8  This implies that a promise succeeds only if the promisee accepts it (see for example Darwall 2011). 
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structure of the activities that the agents are required to carry out). In example 2 (a case of non-
joint mutual responsibilities), Ann is responsible to Bob for achieving success in making dinner, 
and Bob is responsible to Ann for separately achieving success in doing the laundry. This means 
that the failure of one of the two agents to carry out their part would not entail a failure of both 
agents. On the contrary in case 3 each agent is responsible to the other one for their joint success 
in dancing the tango, and this means that the failure of either agent to carry out their part will eo 
ipso constitute a failure of the collective enterprise. We can therefore expect that in the two 
situations the agents will cope with possible difficulties in different ways. In case 2, for example, 
if it turns out that there is no laundry powder left, only Bob (and not Ann) is responsible for 
getting some; of course Ann may have a personal reason to help Bob to do so, but this in not 
entailed by their agreement. In case 3, on the contrary, if Bob faces a difficulty in doing his part, 
their joint responsibility is a reason for Ann to help him, because she is responsible (as is Bob) 
for securing success of the whole joint activity.9 
There is a point in our definition of joint responsibility that may seem problematic, that is, the 
idea of “giving an appropriate contribution.” How is an agent going to establish, in a specific 
situation, what contribution is appropriate? We believe that there is no simple answer to this 
question. In certain situations, the nature and extension of an agent’s contribution to a collective 
activity may be established in details in advance; in other situations, the agent will have to 
creatively cope with unforeseen circumstances. In any case, understanding what kind of 
contribution is appropriate in different situations is part of the human competence to cooperate, 
which constitutes a key concern for the study of joint action at least from Hutchins’s seminal 
book on distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995). 
4. Interpersonal responsibility and joint commitment 
Our concept of interpersonal responsibility, and the subordinate concepts of mutual and joint 
responsibility, appear to be closely related to Margaret Gilbert’s notion of joint commitment 
(Gilbert 1989, 1996, 2000, 2006): both interpersonal responsibilities and joint commitments 
involve normative relationships, are intrinsically collective, and are intentionally created by groups 
of agents. However, there are a number of significant differences between our position and 
Gilbert’s, which we shall investigate in this section. Such differences concern three main points: 
– we believe that interpersonal normativity presupposes some form of pre-existing second-
personal authority; 
– while joint commitment always involves doing something as a body, the concept of 
interpersonal responsibility separates the collectiveness of a responsibility relationship from 
the collectiveness of its content (see the previous section); 
– even when its content is a collective activity, interpersonal responsibility does not 
presuppose a notion of “doing something as a body,” which seems to us somewhat 
problematic. 
                                                 
9  The examples discussed in this section do not exhaust all significant patterns of distribution of 
interpersonal responsibilities among different agents. Another interesting type of situation arises when a 
group of agents collectively take responsibility for some state of affairs toward a creditor, who in turn 
may be a single agent or a group. For example, Emily and Farah may agree with George that the two of 
them will take care of George’s garden; then Emily and Farah share the position of debtor in an 
interpersonal responsibility, whose creditor is George. To analyse how the collective responsibility of 
Emily-and-Farah to George entails interpersonal responsibilities of Emily to Farah and of Farah to 
Emily is an interesting issue, that we have to leave for another occasion. 
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Let us consider the first point. In his book on the second-person standpoint, Darwall (2006: 202) 
argues that 
«the capacity of individuals to make agreements and form plural subjects depends upon 
their already presupposing one another’s second-personal standing in seriously addressing 
each other in the first place. … It is the terms of this standing as mutually accountable 
persons in general that then gives them the authority to obligate themselves especially to 
one another through the terms of their agreement.» 
Rephrasing Darwall’s remark in our terminology, agents are capable of producing interpersonal 
reality at the deontic level (i.e., they can “obligate themselves especially”) because they are already 
related by suitable second-personal powers at the kratic level (i.e., they already stand as “mutually 
accountable persons in general”). This contrasts with Gilbert’s treatment of joint commitments, 
whose creation does not seem to presuppose any form of second-personal normativity.  
As far as the second point is concerned, it is important to remark that in Gilbert’s view joint 
commitment always involves doing something as a body (Gilbert 2000: 54): 
«Quite generally, if [two subjects] are jointly committed, they are jointly committed to 
doing something as a body or, if you like, as a single unit, or “person.”  Doing something 
as a body, in the relevant sense, is not a matter of “all doing it” but rather of “all acting in a 
way as to constitute a body that does it.”» 
Now, it is by no means obvious that all the examples discussed in Section 3 can be viewed as 
cases of doing something as a body. This formula may sound acceptable when it is applied to 
Ann and Bob dancing tango together,10 but what about Bob’s unilateral promise to stop smoking 
cigars on the sofa? In this case it appears that Ann and Bob are not going to do anything 
together. Indeed, Gilbert suggests that in the case of unilateral promises what the two agents 
jointly commit to do as a body is not carrying out the promised action (which is obviously not 
the case), but rather upholding the joint decision which constitutes the promise (Gilbert 2006: 
221): 
«There is some reason, therefore, to see a typical promise as a joint decision of the 
promisor and promisee to the effect that the promisor is to act in a certain way. According 
to the account of joint decisions just given, promises would then be joint commitments to 
uphold as a body the decision that one party (the so-called promisor) is to do a certain 
thing.» 
Following this line of thought, example 2 (which like example 1 does not involve a joint activity) 
would be understood in terms of Ann and Bob’s joint commitment to uphold as a body the 
decision that each party is to do a certain thing. 
It seems to us, however, that cases like 1 and 2 are far from the sense of doing something 
together that is present in joint activities like dancing, playing a duet, or rowing a double kayak. In 
fact, the only way to view all our examples 1 to 3 as cases of doing something together is to shift 
focus from what can be considered as the primary responsibility of the agents (changing a 
smoking habit, doing the laundry, making dinner, dancing together), to the secondary 
responsibility of upholding the joint decision implied in every type of interpersonal responsibility, 
                                                 
10  Even in this case, in fact, we doubt that the “as a body” qualification does justice to what actually 
happens. True, two good tango dancers may reach an ideal flow of coordination, and this will give an 
observer the impression that the couple form a unit. But this is a third-person view of what is going on: 
from the point of view of the two dancers, the experience of being two to dance seems to us at least as 
crucial as the flow of coordination: from the first-person and second-person perspectives, what the two 
dancers are doing is not likely to appear as something that is done by a single person or body.   
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thanks to its transactional nature. This logical shift, however, obscures the fundamental 
differences between the cases we have compared in the previous section. 
Finally, regarding the third point, we doubt that the locution “as a body” does justice to the idea 
that what is involved is a collective activity. According to Gilbert (2009: 180‒181), 
«There is doubtless more than one way further to articulate the idea of a joint commitment 
to intend as a body to do something. One way keeps the word ‘‘body’’ in play: roughly, the 
parties are jointly committed as far as possible to emulate, by virtue of the actions of each, 
a single body that intends to do the thing in question. ... More briefly: the parties are jointly 
committed to emulate a single body with a certain intention.»  
But there are many cases of collective activities in which the idea of “emulat[ing] … a single body 
that intends to do the thing in question” does not seem to be right: think for example of 
competitive activities, like playing a tennis match or engaging in a duel. It seems to us, however, 
that our conception of interpersonal reality does not require this idea: indeed, when no collective 
activity is involved our notion of interpersonal responsibility is sufficient to account for the 
relevant normativity; and when a genuine collective activity is involved, the species of 
interpersonal responsibility that we have called joint responsibility will do the job. 
To complete our comparison, we now want to show that interpersonal responsibilities have a 
number of fundamental features that Gilbert considers as characteristic of joint commitments. 
These features can be described as follows: 
1. Obligations of joint commitment. Joint commitments entail bipolar obligations of each party 
towards all other parties. 
2. Lack of unilateral rescindability. Once a joint commitment is made, it is not possible for one of 
the parties to unilaterally rescind it without at the same time violating the joint 
commitment. 
3. Simultaneity. All obligations of a joint commitment come into force simultaneously, when 
the joint commitment is created. 
4. Interdependence. All obligations of a joint commitment are binding until all parties live up to 
them; if a party violates one of her obligations, then the joint commitment typically 
becomes voidable by the other parties. 
As far as the first point is concerned, there are basically two ways in which a relationship of 
interpersonal (and, more generally, second-personal) responsibility can be regarded as entailing 
bipolar obligations. The first has to do with the fact that certain responsibilities are already 
bipolar obligations. More precisely, a responsibility is an obligation every time that it can be 
discharged only by performing an action of a certain type; for example, if Bob is responsible to 
Ann to the effect that he waters the flowers while she is away, then Bob can discharge his 
responsibility only by watering the flowers, and this is equivalent to saying that Bob is obligated 
to water the flowers. A second way in which a responsibility can entail an obligation is by 
practical reasoning. For example, suppose that Bob is babysitting little Diana, and is therefore 
responsible for the girl’s safety; now, if suddenly the house goes on fire, Bob is obligated to catch 
hold of Diana and leave the house immediately. Of course, obligations of this type are highly 
situation dependent, and it would be impossible to list them all in advance; as remarked by 
Richardson (1999: 221), an «essential aspect of taking responsibility for something, prospectively, 
is undertaking to cope with surprises.» In other words, responsibility brings to the foreground the 
open-endedness of the future. 
The impossibility to rescind an interpersonal responsibility unilaterally is part and parcel of its 
being interpersonal. It is inherent in being a party of an interpersonal normative relationship that 
one does not have the second-personal power to alter the normative position of the other party 
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without their consent (more on this in Section 5): for example, in all the cases described in the 
previous section neither Ann nor Bob could give up their position unilaterally, because this 
would imply voiding the position of the other party. 
Finally, with one-sided interpersonal responsibility (like in the case of a unilateral promise), both 
simultaneity and interdependence depend on the fact that all relevant obligations derive from a 
single relationship of interpersonal responsibility, and therefore hold only as far as this is in force. 
With mutual and joint responsibilities the situation is slightly more complex, because in such 
cases the obligations derive from multiple relationships of interpersonal responsibility; however, 
the interlocked logical form of mutual and joint responsibilities is such that the obligations of 
each party to the other one either stand or fall together. 
5. Interpersonal responsibility and communicative intention 
As we have argued in the previous sections, to bring about interpersonal responsibilities agents 
rely on their respective practical authority; we now want to investigate how they can concretely 
exercise such authority in everyday interactions. Pretheoretically, it appears that agents do so 
through acts of communication; an agreement, for example, is typically made by performing a 
sequence of speech acts: an agent makes an initial proposal, to which the addressee may react by 
an act of acceptance, rejection, or counterproposal. Indeed, such communicative acts need not be 
linguistic. Suppose for example that Claire keeps a door open for David while smiling to mean 
“After you, please,” and that David smiles back to mean “Thank you”; then in so doing Claire 
and David bring about a relationship of interpersonal responsibility of Claire to David, to the 
effect that Claire will keep the door open until David passes through the doorway. But if this is 
the case, it is important to understand what features of communication essentially relate to the 
exercise of this form of practical authority. 
As we have already observed, practical authority may come in the deontic form of right or in the 
kratic form of power, and may be erga omnes or inter partes. For example, the authority to demand 
of anybody that they remove their foot from on top of ours is licensed by a right erga omnes 
concerning the intangibility of our body. On the contrary, the authority of the creditor of an 
interpersonal responsibility toward the debtor is a form of right inter partes, because it is especially 
directed to the debtor. Rights of this type derive from transactions (i.e., promises, agreements, 
etc.) successfully carried out by individual agents thanks to their respective second-personal 
powers. 
Often agents are endowed with special transactional powers that originate in their social or legal 
position, role in an organisation, and so on: for instance, in some traditional societies parents 
hold special transactional powers concerning the marriage of their children; in most legal systems 
the owner of property has the power to sell or donate it; the CEO of a company has the power 
to sign contracts that are binding for the company; and so on. In this paper we are interested in 
the powers to partake in everyday processes of creating interpersonal responsibilities (i.e., in 
processes of promising, agreeing, requesting, inviting, etc.) that all agents have, and are ready to 
attribute to all other agents, not in virtue of their holding special positions or playing special 
roles, but just because they fully regard themselves and the others as persons. In other words, we 
are interested in a special case of Darwall’s concept of equal basic second-personal authority 
(Darwall 2006), which we shall call interpersonal powers; we are interested in analysing what such 
powers consist in, and how they can actually be exercised in everyday interactions. 
To fix ideas, let us suppose that Ann intends to bring about a relationship R of interpersonal 
responsibility to Bob, to the effect that she takes care of Bob’s cat while he is away from home. 
As we have already observed at the end of Section 2, a relationship like R can only be created 
intentionally: in other words, it is necessary for the creation of R that both Ann and Bob intend to 
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bring it about. There is also a sense, it seems, in which such intentions may be regarded as 
sufficient to create R. Indeed, we take it to be part of the human conception of interpersonal 
normativity that two agents are empowered to collectively create, modify, or rescind any 
relationship of interpersonal responsibility if, and only if, both of them so intend (at least as far as 
they fully recognise each other as persons): this is precisely what interpersonal powers amount to. 
However, there is also a sense in which, by themselves, Ann’s and Bob’s intentions to create 
interpersonal normativity are insufficient to do so; for example, if for some reason Ann and Bob 
ignore each other’s intention, the relationship cannot come into being.  
This apparent contradiction disappears if we distinguish between what is constitutive of 
interpersonal powers (i.e., that the two parties hold the relevant intentions) and what is needed 
for such powers to be effectively exercised. To clarify this point, let us go back to the previous 
example. To create R it is not sufficient that Ann and Bob privately intend to do so; it is also 
necessary that each of them is aware of the other party’s intention, and of such awareness itself: 
in other words, the intentions of both agents must be common knowledge of them. But this is 
not enough. Given that creating R can only be done intentionally, it is also required that the 
common knowledge of the two relevant intentions is itself achieved intentionally, and that this 
intention is in turn common knowledge of the two agents.  
Although this situation seems very complex, it can be achieved by performing actions that belong 
to the everyday repertoire of human agents. Firstly, Ann has to perform some action, x, with an 
underlying intention that can be described as follows: in doing x, 
 (X) Ann intends that: (i), relationship R be brought about; (ii), intention X become common 
knowledge of Ann and Bob; and (iii), intention X becoming common knowledge of Ann 
and Bob will contribute to bring about R. 
This reflexive intention corresponds to a particular version of what has come to be known as a 
communicative intention, that is, as the intentional structure underlying communicative acts.11 In 
particular, a successful execution of action x can be described as an offer, made by Ann to Bob, to 
the effect that the two of them bring about R. 
After Ann has made her offer, it is up to Bob whether to accept it or not. Suppose that Bob 
wants to accept it; to do so he has to perform an action, y, with the following reflexive intention: 
in doing y, 
 (Y) Bob intends that: (i), relationship R be brought about; (ii), intention Y become common 
knowledge of Ann and Bob; and (iii), intention Y becoming common knowledge of Ann 
and Bob, together with Ann’s intention X already being common knowledge of the two of 
them, brings about R. 
Again, in doing y Bob performs a communicative act, which can be described as an acceptance of 
Ann’s offer. 
The previous argument justifies the pretheoretical intuition that agents collectively bring about 
relationships of interpersonal responsibility through the performance of communicative acts. It is 
important to remark that, by definition, we understand a communicative act as any action that is 
performed with an underlying communicative intention. This implies that communicative acts 
need not be linguistic (i.e., realised by uttering a sentence in a natural or artificial language); 
                                                 
11  Intentions of similar form were first introduced by Grice (1957) to characterise what he called non-
natural meaning, and later interpreted by Strawson (1964), with some amendments, as the intentional 
structure underlying human communication. The communicative intention we specify here is reflexive, in 
the sense that it includes its own common recognition in its conditions of satisfaction (see Airenti et al. 
1993 for a defence of the reflexive view of communicative intention). 
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indeed, we do not conceive of our work as supporting the normativity of language (in the line, e.g., 
of Searle 2007); what we suggest is that the intentional structure of communicative acts, whether 
linguistic or non-linguistic, plays a crucial role in creating interpersonal normativity. The reason 
why this is the case, we believe, is that participating in a relationship of interpersonal 
responsibility requires that the relevant intentions are intentionally made ‘overt,’ so that they can 
be shared by the parties. Indeed, we conjecture that the main function of communicative 
intentions lies in the crucial role they play in building interpersonal normativity; however, an in-
depth examination of this issue has to be deferred to another occasion. 
It is interesting to compare our view of how interpersonal responsibilities are made with what 
Gilbert says about the creation of joint commitments. According to Gilbert, to bring about a 
joint commitment it is necessary and sufficient that the relevant parties express their readiness to 
be so committed, in conditions of common knowledge. It seems to us that Gilbert’s conditions 
are very similar to ours, if one is willing to interpret her concept of expressing as a 
communicative act as previously clarified. Even if, as we have remarked in Section 4, there are 
differences between the concepts of interpersonal responsibility and joint commitment, this 
similarity should not come as a surprise. Indeed, what makes communication crucial for the 
creation of interpersonal normativity is its being essentially collective, and this feature is common 
to both interpersonal responsibility and joint commitment. 
To conclude this section, we would like to stress a difference between the exercise of what we 
have called interpersonal powers and the exercise of other types of powers, associated to social, 
organisational, or legal positions. In such cases, the actual exercise of power often requires 
carrying out conventional actions, like pronouncing predefined formulas, signing documents, 
making certain texts public, and so on. On the contrary, interpersonal powers are exercised not 
by carrying out conventional procedures, but by performing actions with particular 
communicative intentions; the reason why this is the case is grounded in the fact that 
interpersonal responsibilities are intentional and collective. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have argued that interpersonal reality (i.e., the part of social reality collectively 
created by certain agents for themselves) consists of relationships of interpersonal responsibility, 
understood as a species of second-personal responsibility (in Darwall’s sense), with the further 
condition that relationships of interpersonal responsibility are collectively constructed by the 
same agents who come to be bound by them. We have then analysed certain significant 
configurations of interpersonal responsibilities (namely, mutual and joint responsibilities), and 
compared them to Gilbert’s concept of joint commitment. Finally, we have argued that 
interpersonal reality is set up through communicative acts, understood as actions performed with 
an underlying communicative intention. 
Our proposal owes much to the works of both Darwall and Gilbert. From Darwall we take the 
general idea of second-personal normativity, of which the normativity of interpersonal reality is a 
special case. From Gilbert we take the basic intuition of what is actually special in interpersonal 
normativity, namely, the fact that it is an intrinsically collective construction.  
We believe that this paper gives two main contributions. The first concerns the introduction of 
the concept of interpersonal responsibility as the key normative relationship underlying 
interpersonal reality. Relationships of interpersonal responsibility share crucial properties with 
joint commitments, but do not presuppose that the agents who are so related do something 
together in any strong sense. This allows us to reconcile the fact that interpersonal responsibility 
is inherently collective from the fact that the content of such responsibility need not be a 
collective activity. 
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The second contribution is that we bring to the light an important connection between 
normativity and communication; more precisely, we suggest that the successful performance of 
certain communicative acts is essentially related to interpersonal normativity. This view may have 
an important impact on the study of communicative acts. As of today, in fact, there is a sharp 
separation between naturalistic theories, which are based on a Gricean approach and tend to 
neglect the normative side of communicative acts, and normativistic theories, which crucially rely 
on normative concepts in the analysis of communicative acts, but consider the underlying 
intentions as irrelevant or at least marginal. If we are right, a new approach becomes possible, 
that recognises the essential role played by communicative intentions in the creation of 
interpersonal normativity.  
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